Louisiana Practice - Application of the Exception of Res Judicata in Petitory Actions by Ellison, David M., Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 15 | Number 4
June 1955
Louisiana Practice - Application of the Exception of
Res Judicata in Petitory Actions
David M. Ellison Jr.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
David M. Ellison Jr., Louisiana Practice - Application of the Exception of Res Judicata in Petitory Actions, 15 La. L. Rev. (1955)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol15/iss4/24
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LOUISIANA PRACTICE-APPLICATION OF THE EXCEPTION OF
RES JUDICATA IN PETITORY ACTIONS
Plaintiff, having brought an unsuccessful petitory action in
the federal courts' wherein it sought to be declared the owner
of certain mineral rights, instituted a subsequent suit in the
Louisiana district court based on a different cause of action
against the same parties, again seeking recognition as the owner
of the identical mineral interest. The trial court, sustaining the
defendant's exception of res judicata, dismissed plaintiff's suit.
On appeal, held; affirmed. The cause of action relied on by plain-
tiff in the instant case existed at the time of the prior suit and
was within the knowledge of the plaintiff. Therefore, the excep-
tion of res judicata was properly sustained. Brown Land &
Royalty Co. v. Pickett, 226 La. 88, 75 So.2d 18 (1954).
Article 2286 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provides
the requisites for the maintenance of the exception of res judi-
cata.2 In most cases the article is very strictly construed so
that the exception will only be sustained when the thing de-
manded is the same, the demand is founded on the same cause
of action, and the demand is between the same parties and
formed by them against each other in the same quality as in
the previous action. 3 In spite of the unambiguous language of
article 2286, however, numerous decisions 4 can be found that
apparently reflect the influence of the common law rule that
1. First suit was predicated on assertion that certain instruments exe-
cuted by vendor's children were sufficient to create title in vendor of min-
erals claimed or to estop the children from denying such title. The instant
suit was based on a contention that the warranty in vendor's deed to plain-
tiff's ancestor in title was binding against the children since they had
tacitly accepted vendor's succession. Plaintiff alleged that this tacit accep-
tance was not within his knowledge at the time of the first suit.
2. Art. 2286, LA. CIVIL CoDE of 1870: "The authority of the thing adjudged
takes place only with respect to what was the object of the judgment. The
thing demanded must be the same; the demand must be founded on the
same cause of action; the demand must be between the same parties, and
formed by them against each other in the same quality."
3. Iselin v. C. W. Hunter Co., 173 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1949) (the exception
of res judicata is stricti juris, and any doubt, as to identity of two claims
must be resolved in favor of parties sought to be concluded by judgment);
Durmeyer v. Streiffer, 215 La. 585, 41 So.2d 226 (1949); Elfer v. Marine
Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 7 So.2d 409 (La. App. 1942); Schexnayder v.
Unity Industrial Life Ins. Co., 174 So. 154 (La. App. 1937). For an excellent
discussion on res judicata, see Comment, Res Judicata-"Matters Which
Might Have Been Pleaded," 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 347, 491 (1940).
4. E.g., Wells v. Files, 136 La. 125, 66 So. 749 (1914); Schwartz v. Siek-
mann, 136 La. 177, 66 So. 770 (1914); Choppin v. Union Nat. Bank, 47 La.
Ann. 660, 17 So. 201 (1895); Trescott v. Lewis, 12 La. Ann. 197 (1857); Mc-
MAicken v. Morgan, 9 La. Ann. 208 (1854).
[VOL. XV
1955] NOTES
res judicata includes all matters that might have been raised
and decided in the prior case. The apparent conflict between
these decisions and the Code was discussed in Hope v. Madison,5
where the court recognized certain situations in which res judi-
cata includes that which might have been pleaded.6  Thus,
although our courts do not actually rely on the common law
rule of res judicataJ they recognize in certain types of cases8
an exception to the general rule of article 2286 that "the demand
must be founded on the same cause of action."
The exception to this general rule was first applied in a
petitory action in Shaffer v. ScuddyY It has since been applied
consistently in cases involving subsequent petitory actions for
the same property where (1) the parties are the same and
appear in the same quality, and (2) titles or defenses urged in
the second suit were available at the time of the original ac-
tion."' A party to the original action, who subsequently acquires
a new cause of action, will not be precluded from asserting it."
Although the parties in a subsequent petitory action are differ-
ent, an exception of res judicata may be sustained if there is a
5. 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940).
6. Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 343, 193 So. 666, 667 (1940). The court
recognized three exceptions to the strict application of the provisions of
article 2286 which are as follows: (1) Breach of contract or single tort
gives rise to but one cause of action. But see Quarles v. Lewis, 75 So.2d 14,
17 (La. 1954), where the court treated this not as an exception to article
2286 but as "judicial estoppel." (2) In seeking injunction against the exe-
cution of a judgment, or a writ of seizure and sale in executory process, a
litigant must set out all grounds or reasons therefor which existed at the
time of his application. (3) Parties litigant in a petitory action must set
up whatever title or defense they have.
7. Woodcock v. Baldwin, 110 La. 270, 275, 34 So. 440, 441 (1902): "The
doctrine of the common law courts that res judicata includes not only
everything pleaded in a cause, but even that which might have been pleaded,
does not obtain generally under our system."
8. See note 6 supra. But see Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So.2d 14
(1954); Himel v. Connely, 195 La. 769, 197 So. 424 (1940), which recog-
nized additional exception in suits for partition or division of real estate.
9. 14 La. Ann. 575 (1859) (plaintiff had previously defended a petitory
action brought by the present defendant by setting up title through X.
Having been cast in the prior suit, he then brought this action, alleging
title to the same property through Y; the court held that the prior judg-
ment constituted res judicata to the second suit). See Comment, Res Judi-
cata-"Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded," 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
491, 498 (1940).
10. E.g., Adkins' Heirs v. Crawford, 209 La. 46, 24 So.2d 246 (1945);
Gajan v. Patout & Burguieres, 135 La. 156, 65 So. 17 (1914); Lindquist v.
Maurepas Land & Lumber Co., 112 La. 1030, 36 So. 843 (1903); Howcott v.
Pettit, 106 La. 530, 31 So. 61 (1901); Brigot's Heirs v. Brigot, 49 La. Ann. 1428,
22 So. 641 (1897).
11. Buillard v. Davis, 185 La. 255, 169 So. 78 (1936) (purchases, allegedly
made after a petitory action, could be subsequently relied on as new cause
of action in second suit for title of same property as between same par-
ties). See also Gajan v. Patout & Burguieres, 135 La. 156, 65 So. 17 (1914).
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sufficient privity of interest between them and the original par-
ties to the first suit.1 2 The court, in Lindquist v. Maurepas Land
& Lumber Co.,' 3 extended the scope of application of the excep-
tion of res judicata in petitory actions. In that case, the plain-
tiff (Lindquist) instituted a petitory action to be recognized
as owner of certain swamp lands, basing his claim on rights
acquired by possession under title held by the state with the
intention of establishing a homestead. Previously, in a petitory
action for the same property, a default judgment had been ren-
dered against Lindquist, establishing title in the Maurepas Land
& Lumber Company. The court, in sustaining the defendant's
exception of res judicata, obviously felt that, although Lind-
quist had no absolute title at the time of the default judgment,
he should have set up the outstanding title which existed in
the state, and advanced his rights as a homesteader on the prop-
erty. The effect is to require a party in the original real action
to set up not only any absolute title or defense then existing in
his favor, but also to advance any inchoate claims or rights in
the property which might ripen into ownership.
In the instant case two of the "identities" generally required
for maintaining an exception of res judicata were present, but
the cause of the action was not the same as that relied upon
in the first petitory action. Relying on dictum found in Gajan
v. Patout & Burguieres'4 as a defense to the defendant's plea
of res judicata, the plaintiff insisted that the cause of action on
which it relied was not within its knowledge at the time of the
original action. In effect, the plaintiff contended that parties
litigant in a second petitory action are only precluded from
urging those titles, defenses, and real rights that were within
their knowledge at the time of the original petitory action. The
court, however, expressly found that the plaintiff had knowl-
edge at the time of the original suit of the cause of action on
which it relied in the instant case and sustained the defendant's
exception of res judicata. This ruling therefore leaves open the
question of whether a cause of action which existed at the time
of the original petitory action but was not within the knowledge
12. Heroman v. Louisiana Institute of Deaf and Dumb, 34 La. Ann.
805, 814 (1882) ("No principle of the law is more inflexible than that which
fixes the absolute conclusiveness of such a judgment upon the parties and
their privies."). See also Norah v. Crawford, 218 La. 433, 49 So.2d 751 (1950);
Howcott v. Pettit, 106 La. 530, 31 So. 61 (1901).
13. 112 La. 1030, 36 So. 843 (1903).
14. 135 La. 156, 177, 65 So. 17, 25 (1914) ("At his command or within his
knowledge"). See also Typhoon Fan Co. v. Pilsbury, 166 La. 883, 118 So.
70 (1928).
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of the plaintiff at that time may form the basis of a new petitory
action.15
Although the rule as illustrated by the instant case, that
res judicata includes that which might have been pleaded in a
prior suit, constitutes a departure from the strict notions of res
judicata as codified in Louisiana law, it is based upon sound
reasoning. The reduction of unnecessary and harassing litigation,
which is the objective of the doctrine of res judicata in any
litigation, 16 is even more important in cases involving title to
real property. The desirability of providing some measure of
stability regarding title to real estate 7 is ample justification
for the exception as applied in petitory actions.
David M. Ellison, Jr.
LOUISIANA PRACTICE-FILING OF DILATORY EXCEPTIONS-WAIVER
OF EXCEPTION TO JURISDICTION Ratione Personae
Plaintiff proceeded by nonresident attachment to be declared
owner of a seized certificate to do business and for damages for
loss of profits occasioned by the defendant's breach of contract
to deliver the certificate. After denial of his motion to dissolve
the attachment, defendant filed exceptions to the jurisdiction
ratione personae and jurisdiction ratione materiae, requesting
that these exceptions "be considered in accordance with their
number and/or the order in which they appear."' On rehearing
of the appeal, held, affirmed.2 Defendant's "exceptions to juris-
15. Numerous common law jurisdictions have held that where a plain-
tiff has no knowledge or means of knowledge of the omitted items, his
ignorance will excuse him, and the judgment in the first action will not
bar a subsequent action to recover on the omitted items. See cases col-
lected in Annot., 2 A.L.R. 534 (1919).
16. Opelousas-St. Landry Securities Co. v. United States, 66 F.2d 41, 44
(5th Cir. 1933) ("Res judicata is a principle of peace. Under its influence
an end is put to controversies."); Speakman v. Bernstein, 59 F.2d 523 (5th
Cir. 1932) (general welfare and interests of state require that there be an
end to litigation); State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So.
965 (1902) (time should come when all litigation should cease).
17. Our law has traditionally sought to afford the highest protection to
innocent third parties who purchase land, relying upon a recorded transfer
or a final judicial determination of title. See Loranger v. Citizens' National
Bank, 162 La. 1054, 111 So. 418 (1927); McDuffle v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51
So. 100 (1909); Brown v. Johnson, 11 So.2d 713 (La. App. 1942).
1. Transcript of Record, p. 47, Garig Transfer, Inc. v. Harris, 226 La.
117, 75 So.2d 28 (1954).
2. On the first hearing, the court held that the defendant's submission
of the two exceptions at the same time constituted a waiver of the excep-
tion to jurisdiction ratione personae and cited cases decided prior to the
